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7KHPDNLQJRIWKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDODTueer reading of the European Court of 
Human Rights¶FDVHODZ on same-sex sexuality.  
 
Damian A. Gonzalez-Salzberg 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The presence of same-sex sexuality before a court of law is far from being a novelty, 
but its understanding as a personal characteristic worthy of legal protection has indeed a 
very short history. An important moment of this new tradition occurred in 1981, when 
WKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV³WKH&RXUW´GHFLGHGWKHDudgeon case. On this 
occasion the Court ruled that the criminalisation of same-sex sexuality in private was a 
violation of the right to respect for private life, protected by the European Convention of 
Human Rights.1 The Court has since become the leading international judicial body 
dealing with the recognition of sexual orientation as a relevant topic of human rights 
law. 
7KH &RXUW¶V GHYHORSLQJ FDVH ODZ RQ VDPH-sex sexuality has been thoroughly 
studied by many authors. From a traditional liberal perspective the works of Harris and 
Wintemute have highlighted the importance of the case law of the Court.2 More recent 
analyses conducted by Grigolo and Johnson have ventured to critically evaluate the 
&RXUW¶V FDVH ODZ XVLQJ a constructionist theoretical approach, focussing on the 
discursive power of the jurisprudence.3 Nonetheless, queer theory as a methodological 
tool for analysing the legal discourse of the Court has been rarely used.4 This article 
seeks to rectify that gap in the literature. 
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Queer theory adopts a post-structuralist understanding of identities that contest 
their stability, challenging not only the fixity of categories such as sex, gender and 
sexuality, but also the traditional construction of these characteristics as opposed 
binaries.5 Working within this framework, the article will perform a deconstructive 
reading of 40 rulings on same-sex sexuality issued by the Court during three decades, 
from the Dudgeon case in 1981 to the X. and others case in 2013. The aim of the 
analysis is to LOOXVWUDWHKRZ WKH&RXUW¶V FDVH ODZKDVGLVFXUVLYHO\ FUHDWHG WKH &RXUW¶V
homosexual. In particular, the use of queer theory will highlight the impact of the 
regulatory power of human rights law on the performative character of sexual 
identities.6 The analysis will certainly not exhaust the potential of queerly thinking 
human rights law, but it will draw attention to the relevance of queer theory for the 
DQDO\VLVRIWKH&RXUW¶VKRmosexual past and future.  
Following Butler, it can be understood that intelligible subjects are created 
through an exclusionary process that has, as a logical need, the simultaneous creation of 
the non-subject, the Other.7 7KH FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI WKH &RXUW¶V homosexual has been no 
exception. IWKDVEHHQVKDSHGZLWKLQWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZDVWKHRSSRVLWHFRXQWHUSDUWRI
the true subject of human rights law, the heterosexual, the only one entitled to the full 
enjoyment of human rights.  
Within three decades of rulings, the Court has not offered a legal definition of 
homosexuality. Instead, the Court has been exercising the authority of the law, 
constituting and regulating the legal meaning of sexual identities.8 It is through the 
&RXUW¶V case law that the &RXUW¶V homosexual has been created, acquiring the 
characteristics granted to him by the Court.  
The analysis of the rulings dealing with same-sex sexuality will be conducted by 
resorting to seven deconstructive binaries that have been present -either implicitly or 
3 
 
explicitly- LQ WKH &RXUW¶V FDVH ODZ9 The seven dichotomies to be used in the 
deconstruction of the judgments are: heterosexual/homosexual; legal/illegal; inside/out; 
private/public; equal/different; couple/uncouple; and self/other. Even though just a few 
of these binaries explicitly recognise the lesser value of one of the terms involved, they 
all share this characteristic. As clearly expressed by Sedgwick, many seemingly 
symmetrical binary oppositions actually subsist in a dynamic relation according to 
which one of the terms is nothing but subordinated to the other. In fact, the true 
meaning of the two terms can only be understood by their tacit hierarchical 
interrelation.10   
In brief, the article will engage in a queer analysis of the rulings on same-sex 
sexuality issued by the Court between 1981 and 2013, in order to illustrate the creation 
SURFHVV RI WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO Section two of the article will offer a theoretical 
understanding of the categorical approach the Court has adopted for conceiving the 
legal sexuality of individuals. Section three will present the analysis of 24 judgments of 
the Court through three binary pairs. It will focus on how the protection the Court has 
offered to its homosexual has shifted through the years, allowing his/her journey from 
the privacy of the closet to the public sphere. Section four will resort to two binary 
oppositions in order to analyse the remaining 16 rulings of the Court. It will show how 
WKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZKDVXVHGboth the concession and denial of human rights to create 
its homosexual as the inferior counterpart of the heterosexual subject. Section five will 
summarise the main findings of the analysis performed and it will propose a potential 
way forward.  
 
2. The categorical approach to homosexuality (heterosexual/homosexual) 
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An essential departing point of a queer analysis is the heterosexual/homosexual binary, 
which represents the existence of human sexuality as only two compulsory and 
contradictory options. Queer theory has shown the peculiar nature of this binary, since 
its first term is presented as the category to which everyone is supposed to belong; while 
the belonging to the second group only takes place as an exclusion, by the inability of 
the subject to fit into the first one.11 Therefore, even though the &RXUW¶Vhomosexual is 
supposedly presented as the stable counterpart of the heterosexual subject,12 his/her 
legal existence is marked from the outset by the impossibility to fit in the right(ful) side 
of the binary.  
Furthermore, the binary division of sexual identity not only consolidates 
heterosexuality as the background norm, since the two options offered are not of the 
same value, but also restricts the diversity of sexuality.13 In fact, the Court has assumed 
that every single individual could be perfectly fitted into one (and only one) side of the 
binary. Other possible options KDYHDSSHDUHGLQWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZRQO\LQDWDQJHQWLDO
way and have never been a part of the holding of a decision.  
For example, tKHWHUP³ELVH[XDO´KDVVSRUDGLFDOO\DSSHDUHGLQWKHUXOLQJVRIWKH
Court, but only when quoting fragments of domestic decisions or international soft law 
instruments;14 and an undefined UHIHUHQFH WR ³SDQVH[XDO´ LQGLYLGXDOV appeared in the 
partially dissenting vote of Judge Walsh in the Dudgeon case itself.15 It was not until the 
year 2010 that the Court showed a degree of willingness to open the binary, when it 
made reference to gays, lesbians and any other sexual minority.16 Nonetheless, this 
VLPSOHUHIHUHQFHKDVQRWKDGDQ\OHJDOFRQVHTXHQFHVLQWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZVRIDU 
On the other hand, it seems to be mandatory for every individual before the 
Court to have a sexual orientation and, therefore, to take a place on one of the sides of 
the binary. The Court has implicitly answered in the affirmative the appealing question 
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posed by Gross: Does each person have a sexual orientation?17 Indeed, the complete 
absence of any reference to ³asexuality´ wiWKLQWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZ helps proving the 
belief in sexual orientation as a compulsory personal characteristic. 
The fact that sexual orientation is mandatory, coupled with the existence of only 
two possible options, ensures that every single individual is placed on one of the sides 
of the heterosexual/homosexual binary. This categorical approach delineates a 
UHVWULFWLYHFRQFHSWLRQRIKXPDQVH[XDOLW\ZLWKLQWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZDFWLQJDVDFOHDU
display of the regulatory power of the lDZRYHUWKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOThe adoption 
of a categorical approach has allowed the Court to regulate, contain and constrain the 
legal sexuality of its homosexual.18 In particular, this limited conception of sexuality 
provided a clear departing point for the construction of WKH&RXUW¶Vhomosexual as the 
private and inferior counterpart of the heterosexual subject, as it will be discussed in 
sections three and four of the article. 
 
3. From the private closet to the public streets 
 
The following three binaries are aimed at deconstructing the developing protection that 
the Court has offered its homosexual through time. In particular, the analysis will show 
the 30-\HDU MRXUQH\ RI WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO IURP WKH VHFUHF\ RI WKH FORVHW WR the 
SXEOLFVSKHUH7KHELQDULHVZLOOLOOXVWUDWHWKH&RXUW¶VUHDFWLRQVWRWKHVZLQJLQJWHPSHUV
RI JRYHUQPHQWV WKDW DW GLIIHUHQW WLPHV KDYH IRUFHG WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO LQWR
secrecy; pushed him/her out of the closet; and censored him/her on the streets. 
 
A. Legal/Illegal 
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,Q DOPRVW KDOI WKH FDVHV FRQFHUQLQJ WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO WKH TXHVWLRQ WR EH
answered was whether same-sex sexuality was to be considered criminal or lawful by 
the States. The first WKUHH FDVHV LQWURGXFLQJ WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO ZHUH Dudgeon, 
Norris and Modinos. In each of these cases the Court ruled that the mere existence of 
legislation criminalising private sexual activity between adult men was a violation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.19 Similarly, the later ruling in the A.D.T. 
case affirmed that legislation criminalising consensual sexual acts between more than 
two adult men was also a violation of the right to respect for private life.20  
Therefore, the Court decided that its homosexual was entitled to a private sphere 
protected from the unjustified intrusions of the State ,Q SDUWLFXODU WKH &RXUW¶V
homosexual had the right to engage in same-sex acts, as long as those were performed 
by consenting adults in the secrecy of their home. Nonetheless, the protection granted to 
its homosexual was only a bare minimum, since the Court specifically stated in the 
Dudgeon case that decriminalization did not imply approval.21 This unnecessary 
comment, made in the context of the case, can only be understood as either condoning a 
negative view of same-sex sexuality by the community, or as actually expressing the 
&RXUW¶VUHMHFWLRQRILWVKRPRVH[XDO 
Furthermore, for over a decade after Dudgeon, the legality of same-sex sexuality 
was still contentious. Even if it could not be completely made illegal by the State, the 
Court did not venture further than recognising a limited private legality. In fact, the 
Court has been criticised for failing to recognise a needed difference between privacy 
and secrecy.22 The legality of same-sex sexuality seemed to have depended on its 
secrecy and, therefore, it was never truly lawful, but just kept unknown with the grace 
of the authorities.  
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The legal/illegal dilemma subsists at a certain level in the F case, decided by the 
Court in 2004. The Court decided that the prohibition on criminalising same-sex 
sexuality did not forbid extraditions to countries where the extradited person risked 
facing draconian punishments for his/her sexual orientation, at least when a judicial 
conviction was unlikely to take place.23 Consequently, the scope of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Court also acted as the limit between legal and illegal sexuality. 
:KHQ WKHERUGHURI WKH &RXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ LV FURVVHG WKH OLne that separates legality 
from illegality could also be erased, without worrying the Court. 
The Court shaped its homosexual through the legal/illegal dichotomy in a 
second group of judgments, which dealt with a differential age of consent for same-sex 
and for different-sex sexuality. The Court decided eight similar cases against the United 
Kingdom and Austria,24 and ruled that the domestic legislation that established a 
differential age of consent was discriminatory.25 The judgments stated that very weighty 
reasons needed to be offered in order to justify a differential age of consent between the 
same-sex and different-sex sexuality, but such a justification did not exist in these cases. 
Consequently, the relevant age for sexual consent was to be equal for the heterosexual 
subject and the &RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDO. In this specific area, same-sex sexuality managed 
to acquire the same degree of legality as the sexuality of the heterosexual. 
Moreover, that finding was not modified by the contentious Santos Couto case. 
7KH&RXUWKDGWRDQDO\VHDFRQYLFWLRQIRU³KRPRVH[XDO´DFWVZLWKDGROHVFHQWVLPSRVHG
by a Portuguese tribunal at a time when the legislation established different criteria for 
the criminalisation of same-sex and different-sex acts with minors. The Court did not 
find a violation, because it understood that the conviction had not been influenced by 
the difference in the legislation concerning same-sex and different-sex sexuality.26 
Therefore, the Santos Couto case did not change the lawful status acquired by the 
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VH[XDOLW\ RI WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO VLQFH WKH UXOLQJ GLG QRW DXWKRULVH WKH
criminalisation of same-sex sexuality in circumstances in which different-sex sexuality 
remained lawful.  
To summarise, the Court granted its homosexual protection from criminal 
prosecution, letting him/her rest on the safe side of the legal/illegal binary, as long as 
his/her sexuality remains a private matter. However, there subsists a specific situation in 
ZKLFK WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO PLJKW FURVV WR WKH LOOHJDO VLGH RI WKH GLFKRWRP\: 
extradition outside the jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
B. Inside/Out 
 
This particular binary could be seen as the original deconstructive dichotomy, since 
every opposite pair emulates the inside or outside dynamic.27 Nonetheless, within queer 
theory, this binary is peculiar, since the hierarchy of the terms is highly unstable. While 
³RXW´LV naturally subordinated for being the excluded term, it is revaluated, at the same 
time, for representing the successful abandonment of the closet.28 
While the limited private legality of same-sex sexuality has been already stated, 
WKLVELQDU\ZLOOKHOSGHYHORSZKDWKDVKDSSHQHGWRWKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOZKHQLWhas 
dared step out of the closet, even if not voluntarily. Between 1999 and 2009, the Court 
decided a group of six cases in which coming out of the closet was also the cause of 
being driven out of the military.29  
,Q WZRRULJLQDO WZLQFDVHV WKH&RXUWDQDO\VHG WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶VSROLF\RI
purely heterosexual armed forces, which included intrusive investigations into those 
VXVSHFWHG RI ³KRPRVH[XDOLW\´ DQG WKH FRQVHTXHQW GLVFKDUJH RI HYHU\ LQGLYLGXDO
identified as homosexual. The United Kingdom¶VSROLF\KDG WKHSDUDGR[LFDOHIIHFW of 
9 
 
forcing members of the armed forces both inside and outside the closet. If originally the 
³KRPRVH[XDO EDQ´ VLOHQFHG WKH KRPRVH[XDO ORFNLQJ KLP LQVLGH WKH FORVHW
simultaneously, it forced the homosexual to come out, through invasive investigations 
into the constructed closet. The sexuality of the homosexual was, at the same time, 
forced into self-censorship and disclosure. 
The Court decided that ERWKWKH³KRPRVH[XDOEDQ´SROLF\DQGWKHLQYestigations 
pursued to establish the sexuality of those discharged were violations of the right to 
respect for their private lives.30 The Court understood that there were no convincing 
reasons for supporting the exclusion of its homosexual from the armed forces, and that 
the manner in which the investigations were conducted was an unjustifiable interference 
into his/her private life.  
In the eyes of the Court, being outside of the closet should not mean being 
outside the military, and it certainly did not mean being outside the protection of the 
Convention. This judgment was reiterated in the analogous Beck and Perkins cases,31 
and was the rationale for reaching friendly settlements in the Brown and Hunt and 
Miller cases,32 after the Ministry of Defence abandoned its contentious policy in the 
year 2000.   
Since the military cases, the &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO became a less secret subject 
under the law. These cases were the first ones that granted a protection of same-sex 
sexuality outside the closet. The given protection was not public yet, as it was still 
granted through the right to respect for private life, but it took place beyond the limits of 
the private home.   
 
C. Private/Public 
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7KHPDMRULW\RIWKH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJVGHDOLQJwith same-sex sexuality have been decided 
from a perspective centred on the right to respect for private life. The Court tended to 
base these decisions on the understanding that sexuality is an important part of an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V private life.33 ,Q IDFW WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO KDV EHHQ FRQVWUXFWHG DV D
private subject, and that privacy has been the reason behind the protection granted by 
the Court.34 
However, obtaining recognition through privacy is a limited strategy, since it 
silences the actual existence of sexual diversity.35 The private/public division is the 
manner in which Western law accommodates certain conducts that are neither 
prohibited nor truly accepted, but that can be tolerated if secluded to the private 
sphere.36 Certainly, the prohibition on the criminalisation of same-sex sexuality in 
private still allows the law to disapprove the tolerated private conduct.37  
Conversely, allowing same-sex sexuality to appear in the public sphere implies 
its official recognition by the law, as its existence can no longer be ignored.38 Therefore, 
the private/public character of same-sex sexuality is a decisive issue, since when same-
sex sexuality becomes a matter of public knowledge the homosexual cannot be locked 
back into the closet.   
It was not until the years 2007 and 2010 that the Court allowed same-sex 
sexuality to step out of the privacy closet, into the public sphere. On those occasions, 
the Court dealt with governmental bans imposed on marches organised to draw public 
attention to discrimination based on sexual orientation, which took place in the capital 
cities of Poland and Russia.39 In both cases the Court found a violation of the right to 
assembly, coupled with the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation.40 
7KH&RXUWXQGHUVWRRGWKDWWKHDXWKRULWLHV¶UHIXVDOWRDOORZthe events was an unjustified 
interference with the right to peaceful assembly.41 Furthermore, the fact that the refused 
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authorisations were linked to strong opinions against same-sex sexuality of the Mayors 
of the cities allowed the Court to find the bans discriminatory in character.42 
In the %ąF]NRZVNL case, the Court actually recognised that sexual orientation was 
QRW MXVW DPDWWHURISULYDF\EXW WKH ULJKW WRSXEOLFO\ H[SUHVVRQH¶V VH[XDORULHQWDWLRQ
was also protected by the Convention.43 This point was made even clearer in the 
Alekseyev case, in which the Court reaffirmed the right of individuals to openly identify 
themselves as gays and lesbians.44  
Moreover, the Court has recognised certain protection to its homosexual in the 
public sphere, since it has recently affirmed that freedom of expression does not include 
the liberty to resort to homophobic hate speech.45 In the Vejdeland case the Court had to 
evaluate whether a conviction imposed by a Swedish tribunal for homophobic speech 
was compatible with the right to freedom of expression. The Court decided that the 
distribution of leaflets stating that homosexuality ZDV³DGHYLDQWVH[XDOSURFOLYLW\´ZLWK
³D PRUDOO\ GHVWUXFWLYH HIIHFW RQ WKH VXEVWDQFH RI VRFLHW\´ MXVWLILHG WKH FRQYLFWLRQ
imposed for serious and prejudicial allegations, since it could be seen as necessary in a 
democratic society for the protection of the reputation and rights of others.46 
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG HYHQ WKRXJK RQH¶V VH[XDO RULHQWDWLRQ FRXOG EH SXEOLFO\
H[SUHVVHG WKH VDPH SXEOLFLW\ FRQFHUQLQJ VRPHRQH HOVH¶V VH[XDO RULHQWDWLRQ FRXOG EH
considered insulting. In the year 2009, the Court decided the Porubova case, regarding 
the compatibility of a criminal conviction with freedom of expression. The applicant 
had been convicted of the publication of a newspaper article in which she referred to 
two Russian male politicians allegedly involved in both a love story and an 
embezzlement scandal. She was convicted on the grounds of insult and criminal libel 
solely for the reference to the gay love story.  
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The Court decided that the conviction imposed was a violation of freedom of 
expression, since it caused an interference with her right that did not appear to be 
necessary in a democratic society.47 Nonetheless, the Court did not express any 
objections to the fact that under the criminal legislation of the State the public reference 
WR VRPHRQH¶V KRPRVH[XDOLW\ FRuld be considered an insult that harms his/her honour 
and dignity.48 The questions that remain are: Should the understanding of same-sex 
VH[XDOLW\DVKDUPIXOWRDSHUVRQ¶VKRQRXUDQGGLJQLW\EHaccepted by the Court? What 
does it say about the value given by the Court to same-sex sexuality?  
In any case, WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO KDV ILQDOO\ DEDQGRQHG LWV OLPLWHG SULYDWH
legality, having made his/her appearance in the public sphere with the approval of the 
Court. S/he can now publicly demand his/her human rights and s/he is protected from 
homophobic expressions. Nevertheless, same-sex sexuality still remains of inferior 
value. 7KHSXEOLFGLVFXVVLRQRI WKH&RXUW¶Vhomosexual sexuality is not a violation of 
his/her private life -as it would be the discussion of heterosexuality-, but it is an offense 
to his/her honour and dignity.  
 
4. The inferior value of homosexuality 
 
The following two binaries are aimed at analysing how the denial and concession of 
human rights by the Court has been used to construct its homosexual as the legal 
inferior counterpart of the heterosexual subject. The binaries will show that the outcome 
RI WKH &RXUW¶V GLVFourse regarding same-sex sexuality is the confirmation of its 
homosexual as different from the heterosexual subject, the true subject of human rights 
law. In fact, the differential entitlement of rights has been used to create the otherness of 
the &RXUW¶Vhomosexual. 
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A. Equal/Different 
 
As it was explained in section two, the Court only contemplates two possible 
sexualities, which are not of equal value. TKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZKDVDFWXDOO\FUHDWHG its 
homosexual building on a sexuality that was marked from the outset by the 
impossibility to fit in the right(ful) side of the heterosexual/homosexual binary. The 
HTXDOGLIIHUHQWRSSRVLWLRQLVWKHPRVWHYLGHQWGLVSOD\RIKRZWKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOLV
continually re-shaped as un-equal to the heterosexual subject. This binary is present 
every time the Court analyses a case under the prohibition of discrimination. When the 
Court justifies a differential treatment of individuals based on their sexual orientation, it 
LV VKDSLQJ WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO DV RQWRORJLFDOO\ Gifferent from its heterosexual 
counterpart.  
According to the Court, discrimination means differential treatment, which is 
detrimental to the enjoyment of human rights and lacks a reasonable and objective 
justification. This means that a performed difference is discriminatory when it does not 
pursue a legitimate aim, or when there is no reasonable proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be realised.49 However, since the Convention 
does not offer an autonomous protection from discrimination, the Court can only rule on 
discrimination in conjunction with the enjoyment of another enunciated right.50  
Regarding differential treatment EDVHG RQ VH[XDO RULHQWDWLRQ WKH &RXUW¶V FDVH
law affirms that very weighty reasons need to be offered to justify the distinction.51 In 
other words, sexuality is conceived as a category that should be relatively indifferent to 
the law. However, the similarity of sexual subjects does not mean their equality, since 
their difference is admitted when strong reasons justify it. 
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The Court has suggested the equality of the homosexual and the heterosexual 
subjects, affirming that a difference based on sexual orientation is discriminatory in 
itself.52 ,Q LWV RZQ ZRUGV WKH &RXUW VWDWHG WKDW ³«LI WKH UHDVRQV DGYDQFHG IRU D 
difference in treatment were based solely on the applicant's sexual orientation, this 
ZRXOGDPRXQWWRGLVFULPLQDWLRQXQGHUWKH&RQYHQWLRQ´53  
Nevertheless, the Court later pulled back from this statement, accepting 
differential rights based on sexual RULHQWDWLRQ7KH&RXUWKDVKLJKOLJKWHGWKDW³«WKHUH
remain issues where no European consensus has been reached, such as granting 
permission to same-VH[FRXSOHVWRDGRSWDFKLOG«DQGWKHULJKWWRPDUU\, and the Court 
has confirmed the domestic authorities' wide margin of appreciation in respect of those 
LVVXHV´54 This new statement of the Court was by no means surprising, since the Court 
tends to allow States a wide margin to determine domestic policy in cases lacking of 
European consensus.55 However, it did mean that the Court was accepting distinctions 
based on sexual orientation, seven months after having stated for the first time that they 
were per se discriminatory. 
The Court has had the opportunity to analyse the equality/difference binary, 
through the prohibition of discrimination, on many occasions. As discussed above, the 
Court considered the existence of a differential age of sexual consent to be 
discriminatory,56 and the ban imposed on gay pride events.57 The Court also has found 
discriminatory certain distinctions in the enjoyment of relationship rights, but not all of 
them, as will be discussed in the next section.58 
Furthermore, strong support for the equality between the heterosexual and the 
&RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO FDQ EH IRXQG in the 2013 ruling on Eweida and others. In that 
occasion, two of the applicants had been sanctioned by their employers for refusing to 
perform certain duties in favour of gays and lesbians, based on the claim that according 
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to their Christian beliefs homRVH[XDOLW\ZDVVLQIXODQGFRQWUDU\WR*RG¶V/DZ7KHILUVW
applicant, a public official, refused to conduct civil partnership ceremonies; while the 
second applicant, a counsellor for a private company, refused to provide sexual 
counselling to same-sex couples. The Court decided that the sanctions imposed on the 
applicants and confirmed by the domestic courts had been justified measures for the 
protection of the homosexual against discrimination.59  
&RQVHTXHQWO\WKH&RXUWYDOLGDWHGWKH6WDWH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJthat the homosexual 
was equal enough to the heterosexual not to be treated detrimentally by either public 
bodies or private companies due to his/her sexuality. And that held to be true even when 
the differential treatment was based in religious convictions about the ungodly character 
RIWKHKRPRVH[XDO,QRWKHUZRUGVWKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOZDVFHUWDLQO\QRWWKHVDPH
as the Bible homosexual. 
On the other hand, the six cases dealing with parental rights are the paradigmatic 
example of the shifting use of the HTXDOGLIIHUHQWELQDU\ LQ WKH&RXUW¶V FDVH ODZ The 
Salgueiro da Silva Mouta case was the first occasion on which the Court dealt with 
parental rights of gays and lesbians, and it was the first time that the Court stated that 
sexual orientation was a prohibited category of discrimination.60 In its ruling, the Court 
decided that the award of parental responsibility of a child based on the sexual 
orientation of one of the parents was a violation of the prohibition of discrimination.61 
Similarly, in the J.M. case, the Court ruled that the differential assessment of child 
support payments based on the sexual orientation of the parent amounted to unlawful 
discrimination.62 Therefore, the Court decided that sexual orientation could not be used 
as a criterion to justify the award of parental custody, or a differential amount of child 
support. 
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Nevertheless, the relevance of sexual orientation for granting an adoption is a 
more controversial topic and the Court has dealt with it on different occasions. 
According to the Court, there are three types of adoption: individual adoption, second-
parent adoption and joint adoption, which raised different kinds of concerns.63 In the 
first two cases, Fretté and E.B., the Court dealt with individual adoption. In Fretté, the 
Court decided that the sexual orientation of an individual could be a legitimate 
foundation to refuse authorisation to adopt.64 It took the Court almost six years to 
overturn this criterion, but in the E.B. case the Court decided that restricting the right to 
adopt based on the sexual orientation of the applicant was indeed discriminatory.65  
The Court then dealt with the issue of second-parent adoptions in two 
subsequent cases, Gas and Dubois and X. and others. First, in Gas and Dubois, the 
Court examined the French prohibition of second-parent adoption for same-sex couples. 
In that case, two women bond by civil partnership (pacte civil de solidarité, PACS) 
have had a child through assisted reproduction, but only the biological mother was 
recognised as parent of the child. The domestic legislation only allowed married couples 
to share parental responsibility through second-parent adoption, denying unmarried 
couples of the same right. The Court found the legislation to be compatible with the 
Convention, since it understood that both same-sex and different-sex unmarried couples 
were treated equally.66  
Nonetheless WKH UDWLRQDOH RI WKH &RXUW¶V UXOLQJ minimised the fact that while 
unmarried different-sex couples could obtain share parental responsibility by getting 
married, this possibility was legally forbidden to same-sex couples. Therefore, the 
comparison made by the Court masquerade as equality a concrete distinction.67 The 
Court constructed the single homosexual as equal to the single heterosexual, at the same 
time that it constructed them both as different from the married heterosexual. However, 
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this construction of single individuals as different from married ones becomes 
especially relevant when the laws prohibit homosexual individuals to marry. Indeed, the 
IDFW WKDW WKHKRPRVH[XDO FRXOGRQO\EH D ³VLQJOH´KRPRVH[XDOPHDQW WKDW VKHZRXOG
always remain different from the heterosexual. 
The issue of second-parent adoption was revisited by the Court in the X. and 
others case. The situation this time was different, since the legislation under analysis 
allowed both married and single heterosexuals to adopt the children of their partners, 
while this type of adoption was forbidden to the single homosexual, who was also 
legally unable to marry his/her partner. The Court decided that it was discriminatory to 
deny second-parent adoption to the homosexual, as long as this was allowed to the 
single heterosexual.68  
Nevertheless, the Court again found that it was not discriminatory allowing 
second-parent adoption to the married heterosexual, but to deny both marriage and 
second-parent adoption to the homosexual.69 Consequently, the Court confirmed that its 
homosexual should be formally conceived as equal to the single heterosexual. However, 
this equality was apparent rather than real, since the single heterosexual was allowed to 
marry and become a married heterosexual, an individual entitled to rights that are 
GHQLHGWRWKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDO 
Lastly, the issue of joint adoption by same-sex couples has not yet been 
considered by the Court within an actual case. Nonetheless, the Court has rendered 
obiter dictum a clear opinion on the matter. In the Alekseyev ruling, the Court stated that 
the issue of joint adoption by same-sex couples lacked European consensus, 
gratuitously leaving the States a wide margin of appreciation on the topic.70 
Therefore, according to the Court, it is discriminatory to forbid a single person 
to adopt based on the sexual orientation of the prospective parent, but prohibiting that 
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same adoption based on the sexual orientation of both prospective parents is allowed. In 
other words, the Court has affirmed that heterosexual and homosexual parents should be 
considered both different from and equal to each other: they are sufficiently equal to 
allow gays and lesbians to adopt as single parents; and they are different enough to 
refuse their application for adoption as couples. 
 In conclusion, the Court conceives its homosexual as unequal to the 
heterosexual subject and the acceptance of differential treatment in the protection of 
human rights is the means by which to materialise the existence of a difference. While 
the differential treatment is presented as the logical corollary of the ontological 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ WKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[Xal and the heterosexual subject, it is actually 
through the approved differences that the Court constructs its homosexual as the needed 
inferior counterpart to the heterosexual subject of human rights. Even though the issues 
in which the differential treatments are admitted have a tendency to get narrower, their 
existence is required, since their complete absence will jeopardise the differential 
characteU RI WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO DQG WKH SULYLOHJHd status of the heterosexual 
subject. Consequently, the existence of legal differences, even contradictory ones, 
VHHPVWREHQHHGHGE\WKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZ 
 
B. Couple/uncouple 
 
The couple/uncouple binary draws attention to the manner in which the Court has 
decided that some couples are entitled to the enjoyment of all rights that the status 
grants, while others are not recognised as true couples. Between the years 2001 and 
2010, the Court decided a series of nine cases that established that only different-sex 
couples are to be considered real ones. The Court has recognised true couples, and 
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µuncoupled¶ false ones in cases that concerned the right to succeed to a tenancy; the 
right to be exempted from inheritance WD[ WKH ULJKW WREHQHILW IURPDSDUWQHU¶VKHDOWK
LQVXUDQFHWKHULJKWWRDVXUYLYRU¶VSHQVLRQRUSD\PHQWDQGWKHULJKWWRPDUU\  
 The Court dealt with three cases that concerned whether an individual was 
entitled to succeed to the tenancy contract of a deceased same-sex partner, or if such a 
right could be limited by the State to different-sex partners. On two occasions, the 
Karner and the Kozak cases, the Court stated that it was discriminatory to exclude 
surviving same-sex partners from the right to continuation of a tenancy.71 The Court 
affirmed that a differential treatment based on sexual orientation required very serious 
reasons by way of justification; however, no compelling arguments had been offered to 
justify the exclusion of same-sex partners from the right to continue a tenancy.72  
On the other hand, in the Korelc case, the Court found no discriminatory 
treatment when the continuation of a tenancy was refused. The judgment of the Court 
did not contradict its previous rulings, since it still rejected the distinction between 
same-sex and different-sex couples. However, the Court approved a differential 
treatment based on the applicant not being in a long-term sexual relationship with the 
deceased tenant, but in a relationship based on economic dependency.73 Therefore, 
regarding the continuation of a tenancy, the Court has not ruled out that same-sex 
FRXSOHVPD\EHµWUXHFRXSOHV¶WKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOFDQEHLQDWUXHFRXSOHDVORQJ
it is not just based on economic factors. 
 Similarly, in the P.B. and J.S. case, the Court found that an accident and 
sickness insurance policy that only covered different-sex partners was incompatible 
with the prohibition on discrimination.74 With explicit reference to the Karner ruling, 
the Court decided that there were no reasons justifying a distinction between same-sex 
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and different-sex couples.75 2QFHDJDLQWKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOFRXOGEHSDUWRIDUHDO
FRXSOHLQWHUPVRIHQWLWOHPHQWWRDSDUWQHU¶VKHDOWKLQVXUDQFH 
 By contrast, the subject of inheritance tax has been used by the Court to draw 
the line between being coupled or uncoupled. In the Courten case, the Court analysed 
whether the rejection of a tax exemption for the survivor of a same-sex cohabiting 
couple, who were legally unable to marry, was discriminatory on the grounds of sexual 
orientation. The Court rejected the application, finding that the absence of a legally 
binding agreement between the partners made their relationship fundamentally different 
to that of a married couple or a civil partnership. The Court also refused to find a 
YLRODWLRQRI WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V ULJKWV GXH WR WKH ODFNRI WKH OHJDO SRVVLELOLW\ WR HQWHU LQto 
such a relationship.76 In other words, only true couples were allowed tax exemptions, 
and same-sex couples were not coupled enough.  
Another criterion distinguishing real from unreal couples is the right to a 
VXUYLYRU¶VSHQVLRQ7KH&RXUWKDVUHMHFWHGDOOWKUHHFDVHVLQZKLFKLWZDVDUJXHGWKDWWKH
refusal to grant a pension or a payment to the survivor of a same-sex couple amounted 
to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. When the right to a pension was 
at stake, the Court decided to uncouple same-sex partners.  
The first of these decisions was adopted in the year 2001 in Mata Estevez, in 
which the Court stated that same-sex couples did not fall within the scope of the right to 
respect for family life.77 In fact, the Court understood that States, through the exclusion 
of same-VH[ FRXSOHV IURP WKH ULJKWV WR D VXUYLYRU¶V SHQVLRQ ZHUH DFWXDOO\ SURWHFWLQJ
³WKHIDPLO\EDVHGRQPDUULDJHERQGV´78 The second of these rulings was in the M.W. 
case, in which the Court basically reiterated the criteria used in Courten. The only 
difference was that this time the Court rejected a claim for a Bereavement Payment 
from the survivor of a same-sex cohabiting couple, instead of a tax exemption.79 Lastly, 
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in the Manenc FDVHWKH&RXUWGHDOWZLWKWKHUHIXVDORIDVXUYLYRU¶VSHQVLRQGHVSLWHWKH
actual existence of a PACS between the couple. With explicit reference to Mata 
Estevez, the Court affirmed that still in the year 2010 the States were allowed to 
differentiate between the legal benefits conferred upon same-sex and different-sex 
couples.80  
With these judgments the Court started constructing an unstable border between 
real and unreal couples. 7KH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOLVUHFRJQLVHGDVSDUWRIDWUXHFRXSOH
in certain situations, to be later uncoupled by the Court in seemingly similar 
circumstances. In fact, the incoherent uncoupling effect the Court attributed to certain 
rights has been already highlighted by some of the judges of the Court. Merely a week 
after the Court used the Mata Estevez case as a precedent for the Manenc ruling, three 
of the judges stated that Mata Estevez was not only incompatible with the Convention in 
the year 2010, but that it was already wrong at the moment of its adoption.81 
&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOVHHPV WRDOWHUQDWHXQHDVLO\EHWZHHQERWKVLGHV
of the couple/uncouple binary, while the unstable limit of the dichotomy is being re-
inscribed by the Court.  
Only one strict dividing line between real and unreal couples seems to exist: 
marriage. In the Schalk and Kopf case the Court decided that the Convention did not 
grant everyone the right to marry, since States were free to grant access to such a right 
solely to different-sex couples.82 The Court also affirmed that the rights conferred on 
same-sex registered partnership might differ from those conferred on married couples, 
without amounting to discriminatory treatment.83  
The Court decided to formulate the case as a dilemma involving two of its 
historical opinions: Should it keep the understanding of marriage as the legal union of a 
heterosexual man and a heterosexual woman? Or, should it continue to interpret the 
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Convention in the light of present-GD\ FRQGLWLRQV RSHQLQJ PDUULDJH WR WKH &RXUW¶V
homosexual? In other words, the Court understood that a choice was needed between 
safeguarding the heterosexual privilege and preserving the progressive interpretation of 
the Convention, and picked the first option. 
The Court abandoned its extensive case law concerning the interpretation of the 
Convention in the light of present-day conditions.84 ,WDIILUPHGWKDW³«UHJDUGPXVWEH
had to the historical context in which the Convention was adopted. In the 1950s 
marriage was clearly understood in the traditional sense of being a union between 
SDUWQHUVRIGLIIHUHQWVH[´85 Therefore, in order to draw a specific line between real and 
unreal couples, the Court decided to travel 60 years back in time.  
7KH &RXUW¶V UXOLQJ VHHPV WR EH FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH KRPRVH[XDO WKDW KDV EHHQ
constructed in the case law. This judgment reinforced the inferior character of the 
&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOWKURXJKWKHGHQLDORIULJKWV+RZHYHULWDOVRPHDQWWKDWWKH&RXUW
missed an opportunity to strengthen the traditional institution of marriage. Allowing the 
VH[XDOLW\ RI WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO WR HQWHU WKLV LQVWLWXWLRQ ZRXOG KDYH Fertainly 
reinforced the idea of marriage as the true model for legitimate sexuality. By contrast, 
through the exclusion of the homosexual, the Court validated the idea that legitimate 
sexuality exists both inside and outside the institution of marriage. 
Furthermore, seemingly as a trade-off, the Court decided to state that even 
though same-sex couples could not enjoy the right to marry, they could at least be 
FRQVLGHUHG LQFOXGHG ZLWKLQ WKH QRWLRQ RI ³IDPLO\´ The Court said that a cohabiting 
same-sex couple OLYLQJLQDVWDEOHSDUWQHUVKLSVKRXOGEHUHFRJQLVHGDVD³IDPLO\´MXVW
as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation would be.86 This 
particular statement was also reiterated the very next month in the P.B. and J.S. ruling.87 
Nonetheless, it is still not clear whether this statement would truly have any significant 
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OHJDOHIIHFWVRULIWKHOHJDOFRQWHQWRI³IDPLO\´KDVDFWXDOO\EHHQHPSWLHGE\WKH&RXUW
,Q IDFW OHVV WKDQ WZRPRQWKVDIWHUEHFRPLQJ³IDPLOLHV´VDPH-sex couples were again 
GHQLHGWKHHQMR\PHQWRIWKHULJKWWRDVXUYLYRU¶VSHQVLRQLQWKHManenc case. 
In conclusion, same-sex couples can be placed on any side of the unstable 
couple/uncouple binary, depending on the circumstances.88 Even though the Court has 
recently allowed its homosexual to be a part of a legal family, same-sex couples will 
VWLOOEHXQFRXSOHGWKURXJKWKHGHQLDORIWKHULJKWWRPDUU\VXUYLYRUV¶SHQVLRQVDQGWD[
exemptions. Consequently, only couples formed by two heterosexual subjects are 
necessarily recognised as real, since the Court grants only them the full enjoyment of all 
human rights. 
 
5. A possible way forward? (Self/Other) 
 
The developing case law of the Court has shaped the lesser value of its homosexual 
through the denial of an equal enjoyment of human rights. As stated at the outset, the 
&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOKDVEHHQFRQVWUXFWHGIROORZLQJWKHH[FOXVLRQDU\SURFHVVWKDWRQO\
allowed him/her to become the Other, an inferior counterpart of the heterosexual 
subject.89  
7KH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO DV WKH Other, is needed for the reinforcement of the 
heterosexual individual as the norm(al). The heterosexual is the ideal person entitled to 
the human rights recognised by the Convention, while the homosexual Other deserves a 
treatment that is similar, but is not the same. Most rights should be graciously granted to 
the &RXUW¶V homosexual, but the majoritarian heterosexual consensus will decide the 
limit to such concessions. As long as his/her character of Other is needed for the 
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GHOLPLWDWLRQRIWKHKXPDQULJKWV¶VXEMHFWWKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOZLOOQHYHUEHDEOHto 
become a true legal subject. 
In fact, the Court has ensured that the foundational text of the system remains 
heterosexual, when it affirmed that the right to marry was conceived that way.90 With 
that ruling, the Court made an invaluable contribution to heterosexual privilege. It 
FRQILUPHGWKDWRQO\WKHKHWHURVH[XDOLVWKHWUXHVXEMHFWRIKXPDQULJKWVDQGWKH&RXUW¶V
homosexual can only be conceived as its inferior opposite counterpart. The Court 
strategically presented itself as forced by its constitutional treaty to recognise the 
heterosexuality of human rights, placing the heterosexuality of human rights as a topic 
beyond any possible discussion. 
Currently, the Court supports contradictory statements, which can only be 
FRKHUHQWO\KHOGWRJHWKHUE\WKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWWKH&RXUW¶Vhomosexual is the equal 
that reassures the uniqueness of the heterosexual. It is as equal as the Other can be. It 
deserves the legal equality that allows the Court to approve differential treatment, and 
only in certain circumstances provide true sexual indifference.  
The Court held to be true that a difference based on sexual orientation was 
discriminatory in itself,91 while at the same time it allowed a wide margin of 
appreciation for the States to adopt differential treatment based on sexual orientation.92 
In 40 rulings the Court has shown a (lack of) legal coherence that allows affirming that 
WKH&RXUW¶VKomosexual is both an equal that should not be treated differently, and the 
Other that States should differentiate from the heterosexual subject.  
What the Court has so far not shown its homosexual is enough indifference for 
his/her sexuality to become as legally irrelevant as the sexual orientation of the 
heterosexual subject. Since the law has a normalising effect on the construction of 
sexual identities,93 making homosexuality legally irrelevant will subtract the binary 
25 
 
sexualised individual from this disciplinary regime. In other words, legal indifference to 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶VH[XDOLW\ZRXOGSXWDVWRSWRWKHUHJXODWRU\SRZHUH[HUFLVHGE\ the Court 
on the performative character of sexual identities. If, in the future, the Court decides to 
let its homosexual become an authentic VXEMHFW RI KXPDQ ULJKWV WKH KRPRVH[XDO¶V
sexual orientation will have to become indifferent. That day, the homosexual Other will 
become the Self, binaries will be transcended, and the homosexual subject will 
QHFHVVDULO\GLVDSSHDUIURPWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZ. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
7KH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDO LVRYHU30 \HDUVROGDQGKLVKHUSUHVHQFH LQ WKH&RXUW¶s case 
law will probably continue in the years to come. The analysis performed in this article 
showed how the Court has exercised the regulatory power of the law to construct its 
homosexual subject. Departing from a categorical conception of sexuality and through 
the concession and denial of human rights, the Court has created its homosexual as the 
needed inferior counterpart of the heterosexual subject.  
 It is true that tKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDOKDVVHHQKLVKHURULJLQDOVWDWXVRISULYDWH
subject modified, having gained the right to step outside the closet into the public 
sphere. However, this alleged improvement has been coupled with different restrictions 
to the enjoyment of rights, as needed measures that allow re-affirming the privileged 
status of the heterosexual subject. In particular, the &RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQWR(hetero)sexualise 
the European Convention of Human Rights has secured the heterosexual subject as the 
only one entitled to the full enjoyment of human rights.   
 Nonetheless, the inferior legal status granted by the Court to its homosexual 
FRXOGEHHDVLO\PRGLILHGE\WKHDPHQGPHQWRIWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZ94 A jurisprudence 
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that enforces indifference towards the sexual orientation of the human rights subject will 
necessarily cause the disappearance of bRWKWKH&RXUW¶VKRPRVH[XDODQGLWVSULYLOHJHG
counterpart. In fact, a strategy based on indifference can help avoiding the 
reinforcement of the fixed sexual identities questioned by queer theory. 
7KLV SRWHQWLDO GLVDSSHDUDQFH RI WKH &RXUW¶V KRPRVH[XDO ZRXOG contribute to 
reducing WKHUHJXODWRU\SRZHURIWKH&RXUWRYHULQGLYLGXDOV¶VH[XDOERGLHVEXWLWZRXOG
certainly not exhaust the applicability of queer theory to the analysis of the European 
&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶FDVHODZ In fact, human rights law, as a discourse that holds a 
claim to universality in the entitlement to rights, could take further advantage of the 
ability of queer theory to continuously interrogate the process of exclusion. 
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